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We analyze the design of a unique Spanish public program aimed at recruit-
ing high-quality researchers in public research centers: the Ramón y Cajal
Program. We claim that, after a number of calls for applicants, the program
design changed in response to agents’ needs. Exploiting data on applica-
tions and candidates, we find that the new program design led to significant
changes in the probability of being awarded a contract. In particular, oppor-
tunities for candidates with no attachment to the system were equalized.
Key words: brain gain, government research programs, human capital,
policy evaluation.
JEL Classification: O38, D78, C21, C78.
T he key role of human capital in economic development (see Galor (2005)for a recent survey) makes the design of incentives crucial for institutionsconcerned with human capital improvement, namely, education and scien-tific research. This paper analyzes the design of the Ramón y Cajal Pro-gram, a policy measure promoted by the Spanish Government. Currently,
the Program shares features and objectives with other national and international
programs, like the Juan de la Cierva and the EU Marie Curie fellowships. Initial-
ly, it was motivated by two pervasive problems: the shortage of budget resources
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and R&D personnel in Spanish centers, and the widespread practice of academic
inbreeding. The shortage of funds undermined the development of a career path
inside the system for junior researchers who lack an entry point into the R&D
system. Also, both the lack of funds and the inbreeding practices impeded the ac-
cess of new researchers to the research system.
The program was aimed at financing top and promising researchers, subject
to rigorous and objective selection criteria, allowing them to join Spanish research
centers and providing them with a well-defined career path1. The selected candi-
dates received a 5-year contract in a Spanish research center, as well as a some-
what formal priority in their choices of research in accordance with their relative
position in the ranking. Afterwards, the research centers involved received a sub-
sidy of 80 percent of the researcher’s salary for the 5-year period, paid during
each of the years in a decreasing scheme2.
A key feature of the program in its first two calls was that, for a researcher to
qualify, she needed an endorsement by a research center, that is, a formal commit-
ment by the center that would hire the researcher if she was appointed by the pro-
gram. This requirement was relaxed in the third call, so that endorsement became
optional, although selected candidates with an endorsement retained priority in
the centers that had endorsed them. From the fourth call on, endorsement was
completely removed.
Shortly after the program was launched, there was a substantial stock of ju-
nior candidates within the research centers. Under the original design, research
centers bore the costs of screening for suitable candidates through the endorse-
ment process. After a few calls, though, the stock of candidates within the centers
became exhausted and centers were forced to seek external candidates. This cir-
cumstance made the cost of searching for suitable candidates soar.
The change in the design removed the endorsement requirement and
switched from a decentralized to a centralized procedure of candidate selection.
After the policy change, candidates applied directly to the governmental agency,
and the match between candidates and centers was done after the candidates eligi-
ble for contracts had been selected.
We are intrigued by the extent to which the original design of the program,
jeopardizing the eligibility of candidates external to the system, affected the odds
of such candidates. For this purpose, we exploit applications for data from the four
first calls to empirically analyze the design change and the role of endorsement in
candidates’ opportunities. We posit that the key change in the program design,
remo ving the endorsement requirement, equalized the opportunities for candi-
dates with no attachment to the system.
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(1) See Sanz Menéndez et al. (2002) and Sanz Menéndez (2003) for an account of the institutional
background.
(2) As a measure of the importance of the program, the number of grants offered were 800 in 2001,
when the first call was launched, and 500, 700 and 300 in the subsequent calls, from 2002 to 2004,
respectively. These grants jointly amounted to 365 million euros to be financed by the Government.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the
Ramón y Cajal Program. In Section 2, we introduce the data and provide descriptive
evidence related to the first four calls of the Program. Section 3 approaches a policy
analysis based on data about applications and candidates, and Section 4 concludes.
1. THE RAMÓN Y CAJAL PROGRAM
The Program was established by the Spanish Government in the general con-
text of a lack of R&D personnel in Spain and with Spanish Universities’, hiring
policies being called into question. The latter issue generated lively debate that was
reflected in the international press and scientific journals. The two main issues
were: (i) the lack of sufficient funding and (ii) the existence of social networks that,
regardless of candidates’ scientific merits, systematically hire one of their members
[Navarro and Rivero (2001)]. Inbreeding has a long tradition in Spain. Its existence
has been linked to poor scientific performance [see, for instance, Eisenberg and
Wells (2000), Soler (2001)]. In addition, Spanish academia suffers from hostility to-
wards researchers who have completed their training abroad [Ferrer (2000)].
To encourage the hiring of R&D personnel in research centers while circum-
venting the aforementioned distortions, the Spanish Government implemented the
Ramón y Cajal Program. This program provided funding for 5-year contracts in
research centers for the researchers selected. The selection procedure was central-
ized in an evaluation agency, Agencia Nacional de Evaluación y Prospectiva
(ANEP). This evaluation agency, appointed by the Government, appraised all eli-
gible applicants based on rigorous and objective evaluation criteria (mainly, scien-
tific contributions), so that the better the researcher, the higher their priority to
choose available positions should be. For this purpose, 24 evaluation committees
of national and international experts, one for each research field, were constituted
by the evaluation agency3. Overall, 341 experts took part in the evaluation in
every call. If a contract was granted to a researcher, she could join any of the re-
search departments that had endorsed her. The objective was two-fold: (i) to pro-
vide incentives to research centers to hire top researchers and (ii) to encourage top
researchers to join Spanish research centers.
When the Program started, there were a large number of junior insiders –re-
searchers already in the system– in temporary positions. Most of them had a low
probability of obtaining a stable contract within the Spanish R&D system, mainly
because of a lack of funding. To provide them with an entry point into the Spanish
R&D system was among the political objectives of the program. In this context,
the empirical evidence regarding the first call shown in Table 1 is clear. Among
the applicants who obtained a contract in 2001, sixty percent were insiders; that
is, researchers already in the system.
The original design of the Program, requiring each candidate to seek en-
dorsement by at least one research center, was maintained for the first three calls.
In the first three calls, each candidate was required to have a Ph.D. degree and a
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(3) A list of the 24 research areas is shown in the Appendix, Table A1.
postgraduate stay of at least 18 months in a research center different to her Ph.D.’s.
In 2003, a key modification altered the eligibility conditions, making endorsement
optional, and endorsement was completely removed after 2004. However, while
endorsement was removed, other requirements became more stringent. After
2004, each candidate was required to have earned her Ph.D. in the last 10 years4,
and to have spent a postdoctoral stay of at least 24 months in a research center
different to her Ph.D.’s.
The original design not only prioritizes insiders but also jeopardized the eli-
gibility of external candidates. Later, when the stock of high-quality insider candi-
dates declined5, the design was no longer useful, and it was then reformed. Fur-
thermore, the tighter requirements imposed after 2004, undermined insiders’
chan ces in the Program6, jeopardizing their eligibility and weakening the implicit
contracts between research centers and their insiders.
2. DATA AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
To assess the consequences of the design changes in the Ramón y Cajal Pro-
gram, we exploit data about several calls of the Program provided by the Direc-
ción General de Investigación of the Spanish Ministry of Education. Data on re-
searcher applications and information provided by the 125 research institutions
that participated in the program in four annual calls between 2001 and 2004 were
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Table 1: FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF RAMÓN Y CAJAL
CONTRACTS IN THE FIRST CALL
Insiders
All 60%
Outsiders
Non-resident 14%
Resident 26%
All 40%
Note: Insiders (outsiders) are researchers who have (have not) a
previous attachment with the center that endorses them.
Source: DGI, MCYT from Sanz Menéndez et al. (2002).
(4) Maternity leave, military service or major illness were excluded from the time computation.
(5) The number of insider applicants tended to decrease for several reasons. Some were excluded
from the pool of potential applicants either because they were selected and obtained a contract in
an earlier call, or because they lost eligibility in subsequent calls.
(6) At the same time, the Juan de la Cierva program was developed for researchers about to pre-
sent their doctoral dissertation or having done so in the last three years.
used. We excluded observations with missing values for individual characteristics,
which represent less than one percent of all observations. Most participant institu-
tions have more than one research department among the 24 research areas into
which the applicants were divided.
Our data set is composed of 10,895 applications from 2001 to 2004, corre-
sponding to 6,146 researchers. There are more applications than candidates because
researchers can apply several times for two non-exclusive reasons: i) they do not
achieve a contract in a given year and decide to apply again in a subsequent call, ii)
they apply in a given year in two or more different research areas, thus accumulat-
ing different applications in that call.
The curricular information for the individuals at the time of the call was col-
lected from the free software program Publish or Perish [Harzing (2007)] in combi-
nation with the Journal of Citation Reports (JCR)7. This software retrieves academ-
ic contributions by author using information from Google Scholar, which provides
the title, the source, the year and the authors of the contribution. Whenever the con-
tribution was published in a scientific journal, the journal information is also report-
ed. We have also retrieved the impact factor from the JCR in order to weight the
quality of each individual’s contribution. We define the average impact factor of her
JCR contributions as the ratio of the cumulated impact factor to the number of pub-
lications up to the year of the call. A researcher without contributions published in a
journal listed in the JCR will trivially have a zero average impact factor.
The distribution of applications and candidates in the first four calls is shown
in Table 2. The total number of applications and candidates exhibited a sharp de-
crease in 2004. This fact coincided with a sharp reduction in the number of con-
tracts offered, and with the design change, which affected eligibility requirements.
Unlike the subsequent calls, the first call shows the distinguishing feature that
most candidates had a single application. We attribute this feature partly to the ex-
istence of a sizeable stock of insiders in the Spanish R&D system when the pro-
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(7) We merged data from applications and applicants’ publication records according to the name
and surname of the applicant, as well as her affiliation and research area.
Table 2: APPLICATIONS AND CANDIDATES BY CALL IN THE FIRST FOUR CALLS
2001 2002 2003 2004
Applications 2,871 2,957 3,290 1,777
Candidates 2,789 2,506 2,550 1,342
% candidates with several applications 2.5 18.0 29.0 32.4
Grants 782 497 700 297
% of granted applications 27.2 16.8 21.3 16.7
% of granted candidates 28.0 19.8 27.5 22.1
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data supplied by DGI, MCYT.
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Table 3: ENDORSEMENTS BY CANDIDATE IN EACH CALL
Number of endorsements 2001a 2002a 2003b 2004c
0 – – 286 (11%) 1,342
1 2,037 (73%) 1,671 (67%) 1,456 (57%) –
2 523 (19%) 620 (25%) 594 (23%) –
3 or more 229 (8%) 215 (8%) 214 (9%) –
Total number of candidates 2,789 2,506 2,550 1,342
a In 2001 and 2002 the endorsement was mandatory.
b In 2003 the endorsement was optional.
c In 2004 the endorsement was completely removed.
Source: Own calculations from data supplied by DGI, MCYT.
gram was launched. The insiders in 2001 are most likely to apply only once, to
the center to which they were attached. The same feature can be seen in Table 3,
which shows the number of endorsements per candidate.
Table 4 shows the distribution of candidates in each call according to the
number of previous calls in which they participated. Remarkably, a significant
proportion of previously unsuccessful candidates applied again in later calls, as
shown in the upper panel. After 2002, at least 43% of the applicants had applied
in a previous call. More specifically, the proportion of new applicants in each call,
i.e., those that had not applied before, is around 57% in 2002, 55% en 2003 and
only 40% in 2004. We also report the number of successful candidates and the rel-
ative frequencies of successful candidates. For those candidates with previous ap-
plications, the probability of receiving a grant remains at moderately high values.
In Table 5, we have broken down the candidates in 2003 according to whether
they had an endorsement or not. The percentage of successful candidates is higher
for those with an endorsement, with a difference of 11 percentage points. In the
lower panel, we have broken down the 2004 candidates, according to whether they
had also applied in 2003 or not. If we concentrate on those who had also applied
in 2003, we observe that the difference in the probability of success between
those with and those without an endorsement is now negative.
3. POLICY ANALYSIS
The change in application requirements, with the endorsement completely
removed in 2004, provides a natural experiment under which certain individuals
are affected by the policy change. In particular, we can compare the outcomes in
2004 and 2003 for applicants with and without an endorsement. Our approach
simply consists of a differences-in-differences (DID) estimator. The estimation
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Table 4: CANDIDATES BY CALL AND BY NUMBER OF PREVIOUS CALLS
Number of previous calls
Total
2001 2002 2003 2004
0 2,789 1,434 1,390 533
1 1,072 612 405
2 548 233
3 171
Granted candidates
2001 2002 2003 2004
0 782 297 370 120
1 200 158 91
2 172 59
3 27
% of granted candidates
2001 2002 2003 2004
0 28.0 20.7 26.6 22.5
1 18.7 25.8 22.5
2 31.4 25.3
3 15.8
Source: Own calculations from data supplied by DGI, MCYT.
Table 5: CHARACTERISTICS OF APPLICANTS IN 2003 AND 2004
Applicants in 2003
Number Granted % Granted
All 2,550 700 27.5
With endorsement 2,264 650 28.7
w/o endorsement 286 50 17.5
Applicants in 2004
Number Granted % Granted
All 1,342 297 22.1
Did not apply in 2003 649 142 21.9
Also applied in 2003 693 155 22.4
With endorsement 625 137 21.9
w/o endorsement 68 18 26.5
Source: Own calculations from data supplied by DGI, MCYT.
sample is composed of all the applications in 2003 and 2004. While some individ-
uals only applied in response to one of the two calls, others applied on both occa-
sions (none of them had a contract in 2003).
We denote i for application and s for the year of the call (2003 or 2004). Let
Dis be a binary variable that equals one if the application corresponds to an indi-
vidual who applied without endorsement in 2003, and zero otherwise8. Also, let
Tis be a binary variable that equals one for applications in 2004, after the policy
change, and zero for applications in 2003. Our outcome variable, Yis, is a binary
indicator that equals 1 if the application is granted and 0 otherwise. The vector Xis
contains some individual characteristics that will be detailed below. To analyze
the effect of the change in the endorsement requirement, we consider the model
for the probability of success, defined as being granted a contract:
Pr (Yis = 1|Tis, Dis, Xis) = β0 + δ0 Tis + β1Dis + δ1 Tis × Dis + X'is γ [1]
The critical coefficient is δ1, which measures the average effect of the policy.
It can be seen [Wooldridge (2002)] that δ1 captures the difference between the av-
erage change in outcome between 2003 and 2004 for individuals affected by the
policy rule and the corresponding change for the remaining individuals.
To estimate [1], we consider a linear probability model. In contrast with the
logit or probit model, estimation is distribution-free. Its main limitation is that the
predicted probabilities are not guaranteed to be in the [0,1] interval. However, our
interest is not in the estimated probabilities, but in the average partial effects, for
which the linear probability model provides a good approximation. For a discus-
sion on this issue as well as some empirical applications in different contexts, see,
for example, Angrist and Pischke (2009).
The validity of the simple specification in [1] requires that the policy change
be the only source of mean variation. To control for unobserved individual differ-
ences not attributable to the policy change, we add different controls.
First, regarding the individual’s curricular information, we use the average im-
pact factor of her contributions published in JCR journals at the time of the call. To
control for the heterogeneity of this quality measure across different research
fields, we have considered its interaction with 7 research areas, in accordance with
the classification used in Publish or Perish, instead of the 24 ANEP areas9.
Second, we also control for the quality of the center in which the candidate
earned her Ph.D. The variable used is the scientific impact of the center, measured
as the average number of citations to all the contributions published in JCR jour-
nals by its members. This information is available from the JCR.
Third, we have also considered some individual characteristics, such as gender
and a second order polynomial in the years elapsed since the Ph.D. was obtained,
and binary dummies for the place of residence of the candidate at the time of appli-
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(8) Therefore, Di will take value one for (i) individuals applying in 2003 without endorsement;
and (ii) individuals who only applied in 2004.
(9) A list of these areas is shown in the Appendix, Table A2.
cation. For residence, we have considered the following groups of countries: Spain,
EU-15, Europe (others), US-Canada, America (others), Other countries.
Finally, we have also considered differential effects across areas and by call.
We have considered a set of binary variables for the 24 research areas defined by
the ANEP, and interact the variables with a binary variable for 2004.
The estimation results are shown in Table 6. Since, as mentioned earlier, some
applications correspond to the same applicant, we have used clustered standard er-
rors. To assess the robustness of the results, we have considered two different spec-
ifications, the simplest one without additional control variables in column (i) and a
richer specification with the aforementioned control variables in column (ii).
The estimates for the policy parameter are very similar in both columns, in
magnitude and significance. Our estimates imply that individuals who applied
without endorsement in 2003 experienced an increase of 10 percentage points in
their success probability after the endorsement removal in 2004, with respect to
the remaining individuals. The results in column (ii) are conditional on covariates
controlling for curricular characteristics. Therefore, we can assert that individuals
applying without endorsement in 2003 have, on average, a success probability that
is 10 percentage points higher than the remaining individuals with similar curricu-
lar and individual characteristics.
Regarding the control variables in column (ii), we observe that the individ-
ual’s academic quality, measured by the average impact of her contributions, has a
positive effect, but it is only significant in a few areas (Biology, Chemistry and
Engineering). Also, the quality of the center where the candidate earned her Ph.D.
exhibits a significantly positive effect, seeming to be a factor acknowledged by
the assessment committees. We also find that, other things being equal, male can-
didates exhibit a higher probability of being granted a contract.
In the 2004 call, two further requirements were introduced. First, the number
of years elapsed after obtaining the Ph.D. was limited to a maximum of 10. Second,
applicants should prove a postdoctoral stay of 24 months in a research center differ-
ent to her Ph.D.’s. Our data do not allow us to control for the second requirement,
but we can control for the first one. We also report, in columns (iii) and (iv), esti-
mates for the subsample of applicants who achieved their Ph.D. in the last 10 years.
The qualitative and quantitative results are similar to the full sample results.
For the sake of clarity, in Table 7, we have reported the components of the
DID estimator corresponding to the estimates in Table 6. In the second row, we
have measured the estimated average difference in the success probability in 2003
between those without and with endorsement, which is about -9 percentage
points, even controlling for their academic performance and other control vari-
ables. When we consider the individual’s success probability in 2004 (in the first
row), however, there are no differences with respect to her previous endorsement
status, which is exactly what we would expect, since endorsement was completely
removed in the 2004 call. The DID effect (reported in Table 6 as the coefficient of
the policy parameter) can be obtained as the difference between the first and the
second row estimates. This DID effect is clearly positive and significant.
Thus, our results show that, in 2003, endorsement played a relevant role to
explain the probability of being granted a contract, even after controlling for the
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academic quality of the applicants. However, once the endorsement was removed
in 2004, individuals’ chances became independent of their previous endorsement
status. As a consequence, we can conclude that, for similar curricular and individ-
ual characteristics, the old mechanism limited the opportunities for individuals
with more difficulties to be endorsed.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The Ramón y Cajal Program was created to ameliorate the shortage of funds
for research personnel and to improve the quality of the Spanish R&D system.
For this purpose, the program provided funding to recruit quality researchers and
to provide them with an entry point into the R&D system. When the program was
started, there was a substantial stock of insider junior researchers within the cen-
ters, who lacked a career path because of the shortage of funds.
Apparently, this fact determined the original design of the program, by which
only candidates with endorsement from at least one research center were eligible to
receive a contract. This design led to the costs of selecting candidates being borne by
the centers. These costs remained low as long as the stock of suitable insider candi-
dates was large enough, but soared when centers ran out of suitable insider candi-
dates and had to seek external candidates. At that time, the program was redesigned,
making endorsement optional in the third call and removing it in the fourth. Also,
the selection of candidates was centralized under the governmental agency. This
meant, first, that research centers no longer bore the cost of screening candidates
and, second, that any potential candidate could participate in the Program.
The new design, with the complete removal of the endorsement, is an im-
provement over the original one. Unlike the original design, the new design equal-
izes the chances of potential candidates, irrespective of their degree of attachment
to research centers. The mechanism ensures that the overall quality of the appli-
cants selected is improved by precluding the exclusion of any candidate. Also, the
selection costs are internalized by the system.
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Table 7: DID COMPONENTS
Full sample Restricted samplea
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Without vs. with Without vs. with Without vs. with Without vs. with
endorsement endorsement endorsement endorsement
Diff. in 2004 0.023 (0.017) 0.003 (0.018) 0.022 (0.017) -0.0002 (0.018)
Diff. in 2003 -0.087† (0.019) -0.100† (0.012) -0.081† (0.021) -0.090† (0.021)
DID 0.109† (0.025) 0.103† (0.026) 0.102† (0.027) 0.090† (0.027)
See Notes to Table 6.
Source: Own elaboration.
We analyzed the effect of the changes in the program design on the probabil-
ity of earning a contract by exploiting application data for the 2003 and 2004
calls. The availability of data on researchers who applied in 2003, under the op-
tional endorsement scheme, and applied again in 2004, when endorsement was re-
moved, provided a natural experiment which enables us to assess whether endor -
sement status actually affected candidates’ opportunities.
We find that, in 2003, endorsement status increased a candidate’s chances,
even after controlling for her academic quality. On the contrary, in 2004, when
endorsement disappeared, the candidate’s probability of success became indepen-
dent of her earlier endorsement status. Thus, our empirical results reveal that the
prioritization of insider candidates excluded potentially better candidates from the
program. The full removal of the endorsement equalized the opportunities for re-
searchers for whom the old mechanism proved detrimental.
APPENDIX
Table A1: RESEARCH AREAS (ANEP)
Physics and Space Sciences
Earth Sciences
Materials Science and Technology
Chemistry
Chemical Technology
Plant and Animal Biology. Ecology
Agriculture
Livestock and Fishery
Food Science and Technology
Molecular and Cell Biology and Genetics
Physiology and Pharmacology
Medicine
Mechanical, Ship and Aeronautical Engineering
Electrical and Electronic Eng. and Robotics
Civil Engineering and Architecture
Mathematics
Computer Sciences
Information and Communication Technologies
Economics
Law
Social Sciences
Psychology and Education Sciences
Philology and Philosophy
History and Art
Source: Own elaboration.
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Table A2: RESEARCH AREAS (PUBLISH OR PERISH)
Biology, Life Sciences, Environmental Science
Business, Administration, Finance, Economics
Chemistry and Materials Science
Engineering, Computer Science, Mathematics
Medicine, Pharmacology, Veterinary Science
Physics, Astronomy, Planetary Science
Social Sciences, Arts, Humanities
Source: Own elaboration.
REFERENCES
Angrist, J. and Pischke, J.S. (2009): Mostly harmless econometrics: An Empiricist’s Com-
panion, Princeton University Press.
Eisenberg, T. and M.T. Wells (2000): “Inbreeding in law school hiring: Assessing the per-
formance of faculty hired from within”, Journal of Legal Studies, XXIX, pp. 369-388.
Ferrer, P. (2000): “Returners are not welcome at Spanish Universities”, Nature 407, 941.
Galor, O. (2005): “From stagnation to growth: Unified growth Theory”, in: P. Aghion & S.
Durlauf (Eds.). Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. I, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 171-293.
Harzing, A.W. (2007): Publish or Perish. Available from http://www.harzing.com/pop.htm
Navarro, A. and A. Rivero (2001): “High rate of inbreeding in Spanish Universities”, Na-
ture 410, 14.
Sanz Menéndez, L. (2003): “Coping with researchers’ labour market problems through
public policy: The Spanish Ramón y Cajal Program”, in: Avveduto, S. (Ed.), Fostering
the Development of Human Resources for Science and Technology, Biblink Editori.
Sanz Menéndez, L., M. J. Jerez, A. Romero-Medina, I. Marqués and A. Martínez (2002):
“Una nueva política de recursos humanos en I+D: el Programa Ramón y Cajal”,
Economía Industrial 343, pp. 149-160.
Soler, M. (2001): “How inbreeding affects productivity in Europe”, Nature 411, 132.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Fecha de recepción del original: julio, 2012
Versión final: julio, 2012
RESUMEN
Analizamos el diseño del Programa Ramón y Cajal para la incorporación
de investigadores de calidad a centros de investigación españoles. Se
conjetura como hipótesis de partida que el programa cambió su diseño
tras las primeras convocatorias en respuesta a las necesidades de los
agentes involucrados. Utilizando una base de datos formada por las apli-
caciones de los candidatos, encontramos que el nuevo diseño del progra-
ma generó cambios significativos en la probabilidad de conseguir un
contrato. En particular, las oportunidades de los candidatos sin vincula-
ción previa con el sistema se igualaron a las de aquéllos que sí la tenían.
Palabras clave: brain gain, programas de investigación públicos, capital
humano, evaluación de políticas.
Clasificación JEL: O38, D78, C21, C78.
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